We investigate the effect of resource dependence on district level income in a rare within-country study for Indonesia, one of the largest resource producing countries in Asia. We follow 390 districts between 2006 and 2015, consider four alternative measures of resouce dependence, and instrument for the potential endogeneity of each using historical measures of oil, gas and coal reserve locations, and changes in the physical production of each resource. Using annual fixed effects and first differenced regressions with and without various instruments, we find no evidence of a "resource curse". Instead, we find robust evidence across all models that dependence as measured by mining's share of output is positively associated with district real per capita income.
Introduction
Until the late 1980's, economists generally argued or assumed that a country's endowment of natural resources benefitted its economic performance. Rostow (1959) argued that such endowments played a crucial role in a country's "take-off" or transition from traditional society based on a primary sector, to a more industrialized society with high consumption. Similarly, Douglas North stressed the significance of natural resource stocks as a driving component of a society's long-term output (North, 1982) .
By the early 1990's, however, this positive view of resources in development faced an empirical challenge. Many resource abundant nations, located primarily in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, have tended to have low income levels, unstable growth, and generally worse performance on broader development indicators when compared to resourcescarce countries elsewhere. Auty (1994) was the first to label this counter-intuitive result a "resource curse". This term generally became defined as the negative impact of natural resource wealth on economic growth or on broader indicators of social development and governance (Humphreys, Sachs, and Stiglitz (2007) . Warner (1995, 1999) conducted the first empirical tests of Auty's "resource curse," using a large pooled cross section, between-country study over twenty years (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) to test the relationship between dependence of exports on natural resources and growth in income. The negative association found seemed to confirm Auty's resource curse, and has sparked continuous attention ever since from academics and practitioners. There have followed hundreds of studies testing the relationship between natural resources and economic growth. The size of the literature is indicated by the number of survey articles (Frankel (2010) ; van der Aragon, Chuhan-Pole and Land (2015) ; James (2015) ; Cust & Poelhekke (2015b) ; Papyrakis (2016) ; Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2016) ; Badeeb, Lean, & Clark, (2017) ).
Many studies have confirmed a negative and significant effect of natural resources on economic growth. Gylfason (2001) uses data from 85 countries between 1965-1998 and finds that natural resource "abundance" (the share of each nations's natural capital over national wealth) is negatively associated with its growth in per capita GDP. Gylfason finds similar negative results using other resource intensity measures, such as the share of the primary sector in each nation's total employment. Others have found similar negative evidence (Stijns (2000) , Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004) , Mehlum and Torvik (2006) ). Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004) in particular find that natural resources specifically reduce growth indirectly, through their effects on intermediate variables such as increased corruption, lowered incentives for investment, reduced openness, worsened terms of trade, and weakened demand side incentives for schooling.
Indeed, various potential causal mechanisms have been suggested for a negative overall effect of resource abundance or dependence and growth. The first was the "Dutch Disease" 1 , where booms in resource production and export cause currency appreciation that crowds out the performance of tradable non-resource sectors like manufacturing that may have greater spillovers for growth in the long run (Sachs and Warner (1995) , Frankel (2010) ). Other proposed mechanisms are that natural resource commodities are especially prone to damaging price volatility, or that the low-skill labour required for their production crowds out human capital accumulation by reducing the incentives for young people to remain in school (Gylfason (2001) , Gylfason and Zoega (2006) , Gylfason, Herbertsson and Zoega (1999) ).
Another is that resource dependence weakens the quality of a country's institutions by providing governments with concentrated sources of revenue outside income taxes, thus lessening their need for democratic accountability or openness to demands for reform (Ross (2001) and Isham, et al. (2005) , Bulte, Damania, and Deacon (2005) ). Another related mechanism is that the quality of public spending from resource windfall revenues is poorer than that from non resource revenues, being focussed more on current consumption and less on investment (Cust and Poelhekke (2015a) and Aragon, Chuhan-Pole, and Land (2015) ).
Notwithstanding plausible theories for a resource curse, many other empirical researchers have found instead a positive association between countries' resource abundance or dependence and economic outcomes, and have expressed skepticism about the original results of Sachs and Warner. Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) , for example, find no significant link between resource dependence (the share of mineral exports in GDP averaged between [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] and growth, and find a positive association between resource abundance (subsoil wealth) and growth. Alexeev & Conrad (2016) find positive effects on per capita GDP of both resource dependence (value of oil production over GDP) and of resource abundance (estimated oil reserves). Alexeev and Conrad (2011) similarly find positive effects of oil resources on per capita GDP for the transition economies of formerly socialist countries.
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Initially, this label came from the discovery of natural gas near the town of Groningen in 1956, which raised the real exchange rate of the Dutch Guilder.
Most empirical resource curse investigations have followed Sachs and Warner (1995) in using between country comparisons, often taking care to include low or middle-income countries (Gylfason (2001) , Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2006) , Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004) ). Some researches have moved from pooled cross section to country fixed effects to control for stable, unobserved country-level characteristics that affect growth (e.g. Torvik (2009); Lederman & Maloney (2003) ), and among these, some have still found a resource curse (Collier and Goderis 2009) .
Some survey and individual resource curse studies have offered critical explanations for the literature's disparate findings. Cust and Poelhekke (2015a) , van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2016) and Badeeb, Lean, and Clark (2017) note that the negative association between between resource dependence in particular and growth has commonly been found in cross-country macro-level studies. These and other survey papers have blamed the literature's contradictory findings on weak robustness checks, unobserved heterogeneity across disparate countries that affects their economic outcomes, and the likely endogeneity of many commonly used resource dependence measures. For example, Brunschweiler and Bulte (2008) argue that Sachs and Warner's dependence measure (the ratio of resource exports over GDP) suffers from endogeneity, and instrument for it using averaged historical openness to trade in earlier periods, whereupon they find no evidence that higher dependence lowers economic growth. Ouoba (2016) similarly finds positive effects in between-country analysis once he instruments for a Sachs and Warner type dependence measure.
Endogeneity aside, survey papers have also suggested that within-country analysis may provide a more reliable test of the resource curse hypothesis because it provides greater control over unobserved heterogeneity in national factors that affect growth (Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2016), Papyrakis (2016) , Aragona, Chuhan-Pole, and Land (2015) , Cust and Poelhekke (2015a) .
Of those resource curse studies that have looked within-country, many have indeed found a resource blessing rather than curse. In the case of Brazil, Caselli and Michaels (2013) find a positive impact of resource windfalls on local incomes, public goods, and public service delivery. In Australia, Hajkowicz, Heyenga, & Moffat (2011) find mining activities have a positive effect on per capita GDP and various quality of life indicators. The same conclusion is reached by Fan, Fang, & Park (2012) in the case of local level mining in China, by Weber (2012 Weber ( , 2014 for Western U.S. states, Aragón and Rud (2013) for Northern Peru, Libman (2013) for Russia, and by McMahon and Moreira (2014) in a descriptive study of five resource-rich mining countries (Chile, Ghana, Indonesia, Peru, and South Africa.) Unfortunately, the move to within-country analysis has not resolved the 'resource curse' debate, as other within-country studies have found opposing results in line with the original findings of Sachs and Warner (1995) . Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007) examine United States counties in pooled cross section over time and find a negative association between resource dependence (the share of the primary sector in real gross state product (GSP)), and long-term growth in income. The authors finds this even in more homogenous sub-samples of counties. James & Aadland (2011) similarly find negative effects using United States counties. Douglas and Walker (2016) focus on coal dependence among Appalachian counties in the United States using a panel data set over four decades, and also find negative effects on growth. Guo, Zheng, and Song (2016) similarly find negative, albeit weak linkages between resource dependence and output using panel data at the provinvial level in China.
Surprisingly, while many resource curse studies have been carried out in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and China, few have examined countries in Southeast Asia.
Indonesia is the richest country in Southeast Asia in terms of natural resource endowments (oil, natural gas, coal, minerals, forest products, and agriculture) yet large enough that resource abundance and dependence vary dramatically across regions of the country.
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While some prominent papers have included Indonesia as a sample country among others (e.g. Gylfason (2001) , Gylfason and Zoega (2006) , Brunnschweiller and Bulte (2008) , Arezki and van der Ploeg (2011) ), few have formally tested for a resource curse within the country.
In pioneering work within Indonesia, Komarulzaman and Alisjahbana (2006) analyze the effect of resource rents (from forestry, mining, oil and gas, or in total) on district level GDP, or Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP) in 2001, the first year of Indonesia's fiscal decentralisation. Komarulzaman and Alisjahbana find that while total rent (from all natural resources) has no significant effect on regional economic growth, mining rents in particular have a negative effect. Edwards (2016b) (World Mining Data 2018; Indonesia, PwC, 2018; ICC, 2013; Brown, 2017 Most relevant to our paper, Cust and Rusli (2016) have provided a valuable analysis of the effects of district government dependence on oil and gas revenues on level or change in district GRDP over the period 1999-2009. Cust and Rusli try to address the potential endogeneity of royalties using the instrument of total offshore oil production (within 0-4 miles of a district's coastline) in both level and change models. Far from a resource curse, Cust and Rusli instead find that oil and gas revenue windfalls boost local economic GRDP.
While Cust and Rusli's study provides the highest quality investigation to date of the harm or benefit of resource dependence within Indonesia, our current investigation contributes on several fronts. First, we start our analysis in 2005 rather than 1999, when the capacity of post-decentralisation Indonesian local districts to report accurate data had improved, and we extend analysis out to 2015. Second, we examine the effects of coal dependence as well as oil and gas, whether as share of local GRDP, or resource revenues as share of local government budget. Third, while repeating Cust and Rusli's use of physical output instruments, we also source other instruments related to historical resource abundance -a necessary precondition for resource dependence.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides a brief history of natural resource development in Indonesia, and describes the country's decentralisation process between 2001 and 2004. Section 3 explains our data and empirical estimation strategies for estimating the effects of mining dependence on local income. Section 4 provides our results, while Section 5 concludes.
Indonesia's Natural Resource History
Indonesia is the third most populous country in the world after China and India. Within Southeast Asia, it is the largest in terms of land area, population (255, 461, 700) , and gross domestic product. The renamed National Oil Company (PERTAMINA) attracted many foreign oil companies to join under "production sharing contracts" to explore and produce crude oil. As a result, many oil discoveries took place beginning in 1968, and resulted in several offshore oil fields in North-West Java and East Kalimantan, and onshore fields in Central Sumatra.
Crude oil production thus increased sharply in Indonesia between 1960 Indonesia between -1980 Figure 1 ).
While much less prominent than oil, natural gas extraction also climbed rapidly in Indonesia, starting in 1976. Fields in the Aceh Utara and Kutai districts contributed to commercializing Indonesia's natural gas production for export (Bee, 1982) .
While crude oil has been the dominant non-renewable resource exploited in Indonesia, coal mining also has a long history. In the 1850's, geologists of the Dutch colonial government struggled to find coal abundant areas, with little attention paid thereafter. More Leeuwen (1994) and Friederich and van Leeuwen (2017) ).
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Crucially for our subsequent estimation strategy, we argue that the historical locations of oil and gas fields and coal deposits in Indonesia established by the early 1980's have become the main areas of mineral extraction in the time covered by our study.
Moving to the more recent development of Indonesia's natural resources, Figure 2 shows the production of all resource types from 1973-2012. Together, oil and coal have comprised more than 60 per cent of total production. From the late 1990's onward oil has declined relative to coal, usually attributed to falling world oil prices from excess supply and weakened demand from European and Asian countries and rising natural gas use. In contrast, world coal prices have risen, driven by the high demand in China, India, and in some parts of Europe. Oil still remains, however, the largest contributor to mining production. In contrast to oil and coal, natural gas production has remained modest over the 1976 
Decentralisation and Resource Rent Allocation
Indonesia has undergone major changes in governance from the late 1990's to early 2000's.
The authoritarian government under Soeharto, while providing political stability and encouraging foreign investment, hampered democracy and provided much scope for rentseeking among those with ties to the government. Indonesia's economy performed particularly badly following the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, resulting in Soeharto stepping down and paving the way for a change from a highly centralized to a highly decentralized and democratically accountable system of provincial and district level governance.
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There were eleven foreign companies under contract with the Indonesia government under PN Tambang: Arutmin, Utah Indonesia, Agip, Kaltim Prima Cola, Adaro, Kideco, Berau, Chung Hua, Allied Indo Coal, Multi Harapan Utama, Tanito Harum, and Indominco Mandiri (Friederich and Leeuwen, 2017) . sharing, resource revenues were to be first collected by the central government, and then redistributed to districts such that more resource productive districts receive a larger share of revenues. In particular, a share of revenues from onshore oil and gas wells would be allocated to the district containing the wellhead. Revenue from offshore wells would go to the district with the closest coastline if within 4 miles, to the province if within 4-12 miles, and remain with the central government beyond that. For coal and other minerals, district revenues would be calculated based on the total area in which coal companies had a license to operate, as well as by production volumes and sales price. Coal revenues would thus return to districts based on fixed land rents and per unit royalties. One implication of the overall transfer rules between the central and provincial governments is that a given district's receipt of resource revenues will increase with the resource wealth of the other districts in its province. 6 At the extreme, a district without resource production would receive no windfall revenues if all other 
Data and Empirical Estimation Strategy
We focus on the effects of resource dependence (a flow) rather than abundance (a stock) for two reasons. First, unlike dependence, abundance measures such as estimated oil and coal deposits are not generally available at the district level, particularly over time. Second, most previous empirical studies have tended to use dependence measures. We begin with a measure of mining dependence (which includes coal, oil, gas, and all minerals, including quarrying) similar to what has been employed by within-country papers such as Douglas and Walker (2016) and Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007) for the United States, or the Indonesian study by Edwards (2016b) . Edwards employs mining and quarrying's share of total GRDP for each district in Indonesia using cross-sectional data, in 2009. We use this as our first resource dependence measure in Indonesia, for the years 2005 to 2015.
However, some within-country studies have instead tried to capture resource dependence as the reliance of governments on resource rents or royalties, particularly in studies of large decentralised systems such as Brazil where central governments transfer revenues from extraction back to local districts based on "producer origin" (Casselli and
Michaels (2013), Bjorvatn, et al. (2012) , Rusli (2014, 2016) and Douglas and Walker (2016) . 7 We therefore try three additional measures, namely district government dependence on mining revenues (MINREV) from oil, gas and coal, or just from oil and gas (OILGASREV), or just from coal (COALREV). These data are obtained from the Indonesian The Audit Board publications can be downloaded from http://www.bpk.go.id/lkpp , while the Ministry of Finance data from http://www.djpk.depkeu.go.id/?page_id=307.
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The datasets can be downloaded from http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/indonesia-database-forpolicy-and-economic-research.
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These include rural districts (kabupaten) and urban districts (kota/municipalities). 
Estimation Strategy
We use three approaches to estimate the effects of resource dependence on output:
annual district fixed effects, a first-difference regression between 2006 and 2015, and a similar first difference regression with instruments for our resource dependence measures.
Fixed Effects (FE) has the advantage of controlling for district-specific effects on growth caused by unobserved heterogeneity between districts. GRDP is used as is common in standard growth models, in order to mitigate problems such as potential skewness or stationarity that often occurs in annual income panel data (see Wooldridge, 2016 , and resource curse studies by Mamun, et al. (2017 ), Bjorvatn, et al. (2012 ), Sarmidi, et al. (2014 , and Rusli (2014, 2016) ). RD refers to the resource dependence of district i in year t, is the district fixed effect, and is a year dummy to control for events common to all districts at a point in time, such as changes in commodity prices, business cycle fluctuations, or economic crises. The error term, is assumed to be independently and identically distributed (i.i.d).
We try four alternative measures of our key , variable as described previously: the share of mining in district real GRDP (MINDEP), the share of the district government's
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The 2003 list of districts comes from the Ministry of Home Affairs. We exclude the regions of Jakarta (Central Jakarta, West Jakarta, East Jakarta, South Jakarta, Kepulauan Seribu) and Tanjung Pinang district. Jakarta is excluded because it is not defined as a district under decentralisation law. The latter district is omitted because of lack of data availability over time.
revenues that come from combined oil, gas and coal (MINREV), or from oil and gas alone (OILGASREV), or coal alone (COALREV).
Finally in (1), , is a matrix comprising other determinants of GRDP per capita, such as the total number of annual earthquake events at the district level, the labour force participation rate, and the proportion of households with access to electricity. The latter two variables range from 0-1. Some standard control variables from cross-country growth studies, such as openness to trade (export activities) or private investment are unfortunately not available within country.
We next try a first difference (FD) model because it allows resource dependence to have long term effects on GDP (Barro (1991) ). FD models are similar to FE models in controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in districts that affects growth (Wooldridge, 2016) .
Aside from being widely used in the resource curse literature, FD also provides a "bridging" model for attempts to address potential endogeneity of resource dependence measures using cross sectional instruments. We take a 10 year difference, and retain 2005 as a baseline year to control for initial district GRDP as commonly implemented in growth and resource curse studies (Sachs and Warner, 1995; Douglas and Walker, 2016; Edwards, 2016b) . The inclusion of initial GRDP tests for convergence in income between districts as suggested in traditional growth theory (Barro (1991) and Temple (1999) ). A negative coefficient would imply that poorer districts have subsequently had higher growth than richer districts.
Our first difference model is:
where ∆ , ,
) and ∆ , is the nine year change in the level of resource dependence in district i. The ∆ ′ stands for changes in some control variables like labour force participation rate, but we also include the initial level of population in 2005 (in logs) and the total number of earthquake events over the difference period. We include initial population to test for potential pro-growth effects of economies of scale. We now also include additional level dummies that would wash out in FE: urban status (DURBAN), and location on Java Island (DJAVA). Historically, Indonesian investment and infrastructure development has been concentrated in Java.
We finally use a first difference model with instrumental variables. Several key resource curse papers criticize the commonly used measures of resource dependence as being very likely to suffer from endogeneity. Dependence measures are commonly constructed as a ratio, where the denominator captures overall economic activity in a way that may be related to the dependent variable. We therefore look for valid exogenous instruments for our four resource dependence measures. We did not use instruments in our annual FE model because our main instrument is time invariant.
To be valid, an instrument must be correlated with the potentially endogenous regressor in the first-stage regression, and not correlated with the error term. We follow the strategies of Edwards (2016a) in an international cross-country context, Caselli and Michaels (2013) for Brazil, and Cust and Rusli (2016) past abundance or rises in physical production seem logical pre-conditions for greater resource dependence. We thus instrument for our various ∆ measures using each district's historical level of abundance of the relevant resources, or .
Our historical abundance level instruments are produced using original historical maps released by Bee (1982) and Leeuwen (1994 Leeuwen ( , 2017 . ArcGIS software was used to match geographic coordinates of oil/gas fields or coal exploration agreement areas according to the Bee, Leeuwen, and Frederich and Leeuwen maps with specific district boundaries as of 2003.
This resulted in new maps which we illustrate in Appendices 2-3. We try both continous and binary versions. For binary versions, we classify districts as oil or gas abundant if they had at least one proven major field as of the 1970's, and as coal abundant if at least 20 per cent of a district was covered by "first contract" agreements with coal companies as of the 1980's.
By this time, knowledge of resource locations had accumulated based in part on exploration efforts by the Dutch when Indonesia was a colony. Yet this period also immediately preceeded a "golden era" of natural resource commercialization in Indonesia. One might argue that measurable resource abundance is not actually exogenous to income, since poorer regions might invest less in oil, coal or gas exploration. However, as we have described, historical exploration in Indonesia was funded centrally either by Dutch geologists, or the Indonesian central government in conjunction with multinational corporations.
For continous versions, for oil and gas we use the number of major or minor oil and gas fields in the 1970's. 14 For coal we divide "first contract" deposit areas by total district areas as shown in an original map by Leeuwen (1994) and Frederich and Leeuwen (2017) . Table 2 summarizes our abundance based instruments as customised for each of our four resource dependence measures.
While levels of past abundance or extraction seems a logical pre-condition for dependence, it is less clear ex ante why they should be correlated with change in dependence.
It is possible that for oil and gas, the considerable capital and risk bearing needed to ramp up extraction following succesful exploration could lead to a positive correlation. For coal, first contracts might only reveal the potential for viable coal deposits to be found, which would require time to confirm with geological sampling. 15 Nonetheless, in case of instrument weakness, we also try to construct a change form of an abundance instrument. This is difficult to do since it requires a reliable measure of resource reserves at district level over the two years 2006 and 2015. Since such data is not publicly available from the Indonesian government, we follow Caselli and Michaels (2013) and Cust and Rusli (2016) in using the change in physical oil and gas output. Data on oil and gas lifting are released by the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (MEMR), who use them as a basis for district revenue redistribution. For coal, we use instead changes in combined land rents and royalties.
Taking our first resource measure (MINDEP) to illustrate, the first and second stage regressions are modelled as follows:
We use all instruments together when using MINDEP or MINREV. For OILGASREV we drop levels of coal abundance and changes in coal revenues as instruments, while for COALREV we drop the corresponding instruments for oil and gas abundance and change in production. Our mapping of instruments is summarized in Table 2. 14 For coastal oil fields in particular, we only include oil and gas wells within 4 miles of the coastline, based on revenue sharing rules laid out under Law 33/2004.
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By comparing current maps of main extraction activities provided by the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, it is clear that no dramatic shift has occured over the 2006-2015 period. Thus, there is no way for district governments to enjoy resource windfalls in 2015 without having had successfully proven deposits 30-40 years before. For all IV estimation we use two step feasible efficient Generalized Method of Moments (GMM2S) with robust standard errors rather than two stage least squares (2SLS) to address the potential presence of heteroskedasticity and produce more efficient estimates.
We then perform validity tests for weakness and overidentification, given that the number of instruments exceeds the number of suspected endogenous regressors.
Empirical Results
Summary statistics for annual panel and first-difference data are shown in Tables 3 and   4 , respectively. We have 4,290 observations for 390 districts in FE, and 390 observations in FD with or without instruments. Note the mean share of mining in total GRDP is about 9.0 per cent, while the mean share of mining revenue in district government budgets is about 5.3 per cent. From Table 4 , for the country as a whole, dependence of GRDP on mining has been growing slightly, yet dependence of district government budgets on resource revenues has been declining.
To start with simple correlations, Figure 3 presents a scatterplot of each district's 11 year averaged dependence of GRDP on mining (MINDEP) against its real GRDP per capita.
Already there appears to be a positive relationship, confirmed by a linear fitted trendline. Figure 4 shows a similar positive correlation between share of district government revenues from oil and gas and real GRDP per capita.
As a second illustration, we compare the real growth in GRDP per capita between the country's least and most dependent on mining in GRDP. 16 We find that more dependent districts grew by 8.2 percentage points more than less dependent districts between 2006 to 2015, which a simple t test finds to be a significant difference at the one per cent level. To see if this resource blessing persists with control for confounding factors, we proceed to regressions.
We begin with our FE results as reported in Table 5 . The impact of the four dependence measures are presented in models (1) to (4), respectively. We find mining dependence (MINDEP) in model (1) is significantly positively associated with real GRDP per capita. In particular, a standard deviation increase in MINDEP (0.179) is associated with an increase in real district income per capita of (0.179*0.406 = 0.0727) 7.27 per cent, on average, all else equal. Oil and gas revenue dependence in model (2) has a positive sign, but is not significant.
In contrast, coal resource revenue dependence in model (3) has a negative effect on GRDP per capita, albeit only significant at the 10% level. Not surprisingly given the opposing effects, the combined oil, gas and coal revenue dependence in model (4) has a coefficient near zero, and is not significant. At first glance, FE results may indicate that resource dependence in overall output is good for GRDP, while dependence in government budgets has either no effect, or possibly a negative effect if dependence is specifially on coal revenues.
That is, the closest we come to finding a resource curse is with the narrow measure of district government budget dependence on coal revenues. Looking at other control variables in Table 5 , GRDP looks to be negatively associated with the frequency of earthquake events, though only at the 10 per cent level. Model (2) is not significant, nor surprisingly is the proportion of households with access to electricity.
Overall, our FE results do not support the standard resource curse hypothesis, with a possible exception for local government dependence on coal mining revenues. These results are similar to those found by Cust and Rusli (2016) at the district level for oil and gas alone, but they do not address potential endogeneity of our dependence measures.
Moving to our FD models, with a direct measure of urban/rural status, we no longer use household access to electricity. Recall we also now include initial real GRDP per capita in Table 6 , again by resource dependence meausure in columns (1), (2), (3) and (4). As with FE, we find a strong positive association between output dependence (model 1) and GRDP per capita. In particular, a standard deviation increase in the change in mining's share of local GRDP is associated with a (=0.142 * 0.738 = 0.105) 10.5 per cent increase in GRDP per
capita. Yet also as with FE, the effects of government dependence on resource revenues is much less conclusive. Whether oil and gas revenue dependence in model (2), coal dependence (4), none of the measures is significant, though the signs have reversed from in FE estimation.
Among other controls in FD, the impact of earthquake frequency on district economic performance is similar to that found in FE in all models, though it is now defined as a cumulative total of each district's earthquakes over the 10 year period (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) .
Interestingly, the coefficient on baseline GRDP per capita is significantly negative in all four models at the 1 per cent level, suggesting that there has been convergence of incomes between poorer and richer districts during the decentralisation period. Among other control variables, the sign of the urban dummy variable is positive but not significant in any specification. There is marginal evidence that districts located in Java have grown more rapidly than other districts, though significant only at the 10% level in model (1).
To summarize, with first difference models where potential endogeneity of resource dependence is not yet addressed, we again find evidence that dependence of output on mining resources is positively associated with real GRDP, and no clear evidence that government revenue dependence affects real GRDP.
We finally move to what we believe are our most credible specifications, FD with instrumental variables. Models (1 ), (2 ), (3 )    and (4 )  of Table 6 provide results using the continous form of our abundance type instruments (along with change in output instruments), while the same columns in Table 7 provides results with binary type abundance instruments.
Recall that the continous abundance instruments are defined as the total number of major and minor petroleum (oil and natural gas) fields in the 1970's, and the share of coal deposit areas to total district areas in the 1980's.
We start with whether the continuous instruments satisfy relevance and (1') to (4'), though with a p value of only 0.1486 in model (4') of 0.1486. Thus our instruments appear valid for Table 6 .
We next test whether our (change in) resource dependence measures, the ∆ for each model, are exogenous. In the share of GRDP model (1'), the p value from a Hausman-type endogeneity test cannot reject exogeneity (p value 0.2481), whereas in all share of revenue models (2 ), (3 ),   and (4 )  exogeneity can be clearly or marginally rejected, with p values of 0.015, 0.018, and .108, respectively. For Table 6 we therefore take models (1), (2 ),(3 )   to be the most credible, with ambiguous evidence between (4) and (4 ).  Just as in the FD case without instruments, we find no evidence that non-renewable resource dependence creates an adverse effect on growth. Instead, we now find evidence of a positive effect on growth of local government dependence on oil and gas (model (2 ))  and of dependence of revenue on mining overall for model (4 )  if instruments are used. As before however, we find no signifcant effect on growth of coal revenue dependence in model (3 ),  though with a negative sign. More specifically, an increase of a standard deviation in the change in oil and gas revenue dependence increases long run real income per capita by in overall mining revenue dependence increases income by (0.084*1.164=0.0982) 9.8 per cent. These findings do not support a resource curse, but are consistent with past desriptive claims about the beneficial effects of past oil booms in Indonesia (see Gylfason, 2001; Rosser, 2007; Sovacool, 2010) .
The effects of other control variables are generally similar to the FD model without instruments. For example, the cumulative number of earthquakes over 10 years negatively affects per capita income growth at district level in Indonesia in all four models of resource dependence. Initial GRDP per capita again has a strong negative association with district income per capita, indicating convergence as before. Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
As a robustness check, we try a similar exercise to Table 6 with binary definitions of historical abundance in Table 7 . As previously described, districts are classified as oil and gas abundant if they contained at least one major field, and coal abundant if coal deposit agreements take up 20% of its land area or more. Kleibergen F statistics still indicate instrument strength for all revenue dependence models (2'), (3') and (4'), with F values between 13.896 and 30.976, respectively. Instruments are weaker, however, for GRDP share in model (1 )  with an F value of 7.76. More happily, overidentification test p values are clearly above rejection thresholds in all models. Thus the binary abundance instruments combined (combined with physical production change instruments) are valid, albeit with some weakness in model (1'). Exogeneity tests for resource dependence again indicate as before that it cannot be rejected for model (1) and can be rejected for (2'), and can now more clearly be rejected in (4'), but now not rejected for model (3). We therefore treat (1), (2'), (3) and (4') as our most credible specifations.
Moving to findings, we find that resource dependence is significantly positively associated with GRDP in three of four models -mining's share of GRDP, oil and gas revenue dependence, and overall mining revenue dependence. The coefficient on coal revenue dependence in (3) is positive also, but not significant. To illustrate, in model (2'), a one standard deviation increase in the change in oil and gas revenue dependence is associated with an increase in per capita GRDP of about (0.091*1.359 = 0.124) 12.4 per cent. Thus, with binary abundance instruments, we find our strongest evidence of a resource blessing, with mining's share of GRDP or oil and gas or overall mining's share of local government revenue positively associated with per capita real income, and thus with growth.
Discussion and Conclusion
Overall, we have almost no evidence of a resource curse within Indonesia. Rather, with estimation methods that control for unobserved heterogeneity between districts that could affect their growth in GRDP, and valid instruments for potentially endogenous measures of resource dependence, we find strong evidence of a classical resource blessing. When resource dependence is measured as the share mining (oil, gas and coal) holds in a district's gross regional domestic product, MINDEP, we find this is significantly positively associated with GRDP in fixed effects estimation, and first difference estimation, with or without here, where endogeneity is addressed using valid instruments, we find that dependence on oil and gas revenues, or from overall mining revenues, is also positively associated with growth.
In our most credible specification (first difference with continous instruments), a standard deviation increase in the change in OILGASREV increases income between 2006 and 2015 by 16.1%. The only resource dependence measure for which we find no pro-growth effects is coal revenue dependence. Table 8 provides a qualitative summary of our findings.
In the context of the resource curse literature, our results are in contrast with findings from some prominent between-country studies (from Sachs and Warner (1995) , (1999) However, this latter study was among the first regression based papers addressing the resource curse in Indonesia, and was based on cross section data for a single year, without control for the endogeneity of its rents measure. Our results are consistent with those of Cust and Rusli (2016) , who when following districts over time and using instruments, find oil and gas revenue dependence to be positively associated with growth in district GRDP. We confirm this result, but using more recent and reliable data (post decentralisation), additional instruments, and the alternative resource dependence measure of mining's share of GRDP.
To the extent that even some within country studies do find evidence of a resource curse (e.g. Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007) , James and Aadland (2011) and Douglas and Walker (2016) (Hill, Resosudarmo, Vidyattama, 2008; Hill and Vidyattama, 2016) . Other, sometimes descriptive studies have also noted that Indonesia has avoided a resource curse (Usui (1997) , Rosser (2007) , di John (2011) and Chandra (2012) . These studies argue that Indonesia successfully escaped a Dutch disease during earlier oil price booms in 1973-1985 as a result of using its oil windfalls to strengthen both its agricultural and manufacturing sectors.
Although such "activist" industrial policy interventions have not persisted, they may have benefited resource intensive regions in the years prior to decentralisation.
Second, along with the implementation of decentralisation of public good provision and funding, the central government of Indonesia has encouraged the accountability of district governments to improve their performance through incentive systems of rewards and punishments. See Davoodi and Zou (1998) for a detailed discussion of how fiscal decentralisation may raise economic efficiency if district governments are better placed to provide local public services, and if competition between district governments and rapid mobility of citizens results in better matching of preferences between governments and local people. local district local governments regarding the quality of their financial reporting. The BPK announces their findings every six months. Even more ambitiously, since 2010, the Indonesian Ministry of Home Affairs has annually evaluated district governments and ranked them based upon their performance across several critera.
18
This too is publicly circulated.
Thus, to the extent improved governance can forestall a resource curse, Indonesia's specific implementation of decentralisation may have contributed. The resource revenue redistribution formula put in place in 2004 may have contributed to expanding the ability of local districts to fund their broadened activities, and the incentives also put in place may have ensured these activities have contributed to economic growth.
Our study cannot pinpoint the mechanisms through which resource dependence aids per capita income within Indonesia, and nor can we be sure that rising per capita income translates to broader development objectives in health, education, or poverty reduction.
Nonetheless, when holding constant the institutional features common throughout Indonesia, we find evidence that on average, dependence of GRDP or government revenues on mining has been a blessing, rather than curse, to real per capita income.
Specifically, the Ministry of Home Affairs investigates and ranks districts according to their compliance with national rules and procedures, effectiveness of public consultation, transparency in budget planning and reporting, and innovation to improve the local region.
Variable
Definition Source 
